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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp.,1 a divided Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the state constitutional right to a jury trial applied 
to individuals bringing suit under the retaliatory discharge 
provision2 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA).3 The court 
determined, as a matter of law, that the nature of the controversy 
overrode the default presumption that matters arising under the 
WCA are not entitled to jury trials.4 
This case note first provides an abbreviated history of the civil 
right to a jury trial,5 the WCA,6 and the evolving claim of retaliatory 
discharge.7 It then fuses these histories and discusses jury trials in 
cases where an employee is discharged in retaliation for exercising 
his or her workers’ compensation rights.8 
This note then turns to the Schmitz decision, recounting both 
the majority and dissenting opinions.9 Although this note finds the 
court ultimately came to the correct conclusion, it contends that 
the court erred by finding that section 176.82 of the WCA was 
unambiguous.10 It explores an additional avenue of analysis—
 
 1.  Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Schmitz III), 852 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Minn. 
2014). 
 2.  MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1 (2014).  
 3.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862.  
 4.  See Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 677 (citing Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 
639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002).  
 5.  See infra Part II.A. 
 6.  See infra Part II.B.  
 7.  See infra Part II.C.  
 8.  See infra Part II.D. 
 9.  See infra Part III. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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statutory interpretation—which further supports the Schmitz 
holding.11 The court ought to have compensated for ambiguities 
within the WCA, whether by applying textual canons of 
construction12 or employing the purposive approach.13 
II. HISTORY 
The instant matter—civil jury trials in retaliatory discharge 
actions arising under the WCA—exists at the intersection of several 
legal spheres, including employment law, workers’ compensation, 
and the judge/jury dichotomy. In order to understand the Schmitz 
holding, it is critical to understand the history of these underlying 
topics. This historical overview juggles several issues simultaneously: 
(1) civil jury trials, (2) the workers’ compensation system, and (3) 
retaliatory discharge claims. Ultimately, these three topics will be 
woven together, forming a fabric that provides the framework for 
the Schmitz decision. 
A. The Civil Right to a Jury Trial 
Although the origins of the civil right to a jury trial are 
debated,14 the history is clearer when honing in on the civil right to 
a jury trial in America.15 The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury “[i]n [s]uits at 
common law.”16 Minnesota drafted its own constitution in 1857 
before it achieved statehood in 1858.17 Minnesota’s Constitution 
 
 11.  See infra Part IV.B–.C. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 14.  See Grant M. Borgen, Note, Civil Procedure: The Civil Right to a Jury Trial 
and What It Means for Minnesota Creditors in Light of United Prairie Bank-Mountain 
Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 245, 247 
n.15 (2012) (juxtaposing sources which contest whether the civil right to a jury 
trial is traceable to the Magna Carta). 
 15.  See id. at 247–49. Even in America, the civil right to jury trial was initially 
debated prior to its inclusion in the federal Constitution. Id. 
 16.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved 
. . . .”).  
 17.  Fred L. Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 295–99 (2002). See generally Douglas A. Hedin, The 
Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota’s Constitutional Past, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 242–45 (2003) (providing a history of the evolution of 
Minnesota’s Constitution). 
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provides a similar, but distinct, guarantee as compared to the U.S. 
Constitution.18 This is important because the Seventh Amendment 
does not apply to states,19 making federal precedent persuasive but 
not precedential in Minnesota.20 
Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution states that 
“[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend 
to all cases at law . . . .”21 The case of Ewert v. City of Winthrop 
established that the civil right to jury trial “must be found either in 
the Minnesota Constitution or provided specifically by statute.”22 
When there is no explicit statutory grant for jury trial, the focus of 
the inquiry is whether the claim is an action at law, for which the 
constitution guarantees a jury trial, or an action in equity, to which 
no similar right attaches.23 
Minnesota courts evaluate whether a cause of action would 
have been entitled to a jury trial at the time the Minnesota 
Constitution was adopted in 1857.24 However, the right to jury trial 
is not frozen to only causes of action that existed in 1857.25 Recent 
Minnesota Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the right to 
jury trial instead depends on the general “nature and character of 
the controversy.”26 This involves examining the nature of the claim 
(at law or in equity) and the nature of the relief sought (damages 
versus injunctive relief).27 If the party brings a claim at law and 
seeks damages, there is a constitutional right to a jury trial.28 
 
 18.  Notably, Minnesota does not require a minimum amount of damages. 
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 19.  Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 
MINN. L. REV. 639, 645–46 (1973). 
 20.  See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988).  
 21.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added); cf. United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“[T]he interest in fairness and reliability protected by 
the right to jury trial—a common law right that defendants enjoyed for centuries   
. . . has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”).  
 22.  Ewert v. City of Winthrop, 278 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 1979).  
 23.  Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002). This 
dichotomy between legal and equitable actions often boils down to whether the 
parties seek monetary damages (legal) or injunctive relief (equitable). See Bond v. 
Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 43–44, 63 N.W. 3, 3–4 (1895).  
 24.  Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Minn. 
2001). 
 25.  United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
813 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2012) (citing Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 349).  
 26.  Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353. 
 27.  Id. However, “seeking monetary relief is not enough by itself to guarantee 
4
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B. Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
The WCA29 is a much more recent development than the right 
to jury trial.30 In Minnesota, workers’ compensation legislation was 
first enacted in 1913 and has been compulsory since 1937.31 The 
WCA was “devised to provide protection to workmen in the form of 
compensation for injuries arising from hazards having a reasonable 
relation to [their] employment . . . .”32 The workers’ compensation 
system is “based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights 
and defenses by employers and employees alike.”33 The Act was 
overhauled in 198334 and amended significantly in 1995.35 
1. Protecting Workers: A Historical Perspective 
Minnesota was one of the first states36 to enact a workers’ 
compensation act; New York passed the first compulsory workers’ 
 
a jury trial . . . . While claims for money damages are typically legal claims, a party 
should not be permitted to cloak or disguise an equitable action simply by its 
prayer for relief.” Id. (citation omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court, when 
determining whether a claim warrants a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, 
places greater emphasis on the remedy sought than does the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. See, e.g., Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). 
 28.  See Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353. 
 29.  MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2014). 
 30.  Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) 
(calling the WCA “a salutary social development”).  
 31.  Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (current version at 
MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.861); see also Act of Mar. 12, 1937, ch. 64, 1937 Minn. 
Laws 109, 111 (current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 176.021–.031).  
 32.  Jones, 277 Minn. at 277, 152 N.W.2d at 358–59.  
 33.  MINN. STAT. § 176.001. 
 34.  See generally Leslie Altman et al., Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Scheme: 
The Effects and Effectiveness of the 1983 Amendments, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843, 
864 (1987) (analyzing substantive changes resulting from 1983 amendments).  
 35.  See generally Thomas L. Johnson & Catherine J. Wasson, The Minnesota 
Workers’ Compensation Act: Amendments by the 1995 Minnesota Legislature, 22 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1493, 1494 (1996) (detailing the impact of the 1995 
amendments). 
 36.  Minnesota was not only one of the first states to enact a workers’ 
compensation act, it was one of the three pioneering states to consider the 
concept. Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers’ Safety and Health, 
1877–1917, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/mono-
regsafepart06.htm (“In 1909 New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota set up 
commissions to investigate the question of employers’ liability for accidents.”).  
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compensation law in 1910,37 and by 1949 all states had similar laws 
on the books.38 These legislative innovations protected workers 
who, courtesy of the industrial revolution, were at great risk for 
physical injuries on the job.39 This was part of the momentum from 
progressive era reforms wherein the government intervened on the 
formerly sacrosanct freedom of contract40 in order to protect 
individuals from industry.41 Although textbooks often focus on 
legislative efforts to safeguard child laborers and curtail the 
workday, the enactment of workers’ compensation laws is an oft-
forgotten landmark in the history of workers’ rights.42 Acts like 
Minnesota’s WCA were truly revolutionary, abandoning the 
common-law principles of contributory negligence and assumption 
of the risk43 in cases involving workplace injuries in exchange for 
statutorily guaranteed compensation regardless of fault.44 
 
 37.  Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945. Notably, however, 
New York’s law covered only certain dangerous types of employment. Barry 
Bennett, Workers’ Compensation and the Laborer: Reflections of an Uninjured Jurist, 11 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 211, 214–15 (1990). 
 38.  The U.S. Supreme Court held New York’s workers’ compensation laws 
constitutional in 1917, at which point “the path of reform was clear” to the rest of 
the nation. Bennett, supra note 37, at 215.  
 39.  Id. at 212 (“The industrial revolution was not always kind to the laborer.  
. . . [M]echanization was cutting off not just spirit but arms and legs as well . . . .”). 
 40.  Law students will surely remember the infamous Lochner era in which 
courts relied on freedom of contract principles to strike down regulatory 
legislation. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the 
American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (1991) (“In Due Process 
Clause disputes, the judges delimited governmental power over private property 
by fleshing out the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘liberty of contract.’”). 
 41.  In the early 1900s, progressives were no longer content with employers 
bearing sole responsibility for the health and safety of workers. They sought the 
help of a higher power—the government—to achieve their reform goals. In 1911, 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel voiced these concerns at an 
industrial safety conference, stating that “it takes the government to establish the 
rules of the game” to ensure that workers are properly protected. See MacLaury, 
supra note 36. 
 42.  See, e.g., AARON H. CAPLAN, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 229–30 (2015).  
 43.  See, e.g., Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992) 
(“The Act . . . was designed to give workers immediate recovery for their injuries 
suffered while on the job, without regard to the common law’s ‘three evil sisters,’ 
contributory negligence, the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of risk.”); see also 
Marco Heimann, Experimental Studies on Moral Values in Finance: Windfall 
Gains, Socially Responsible Investment, and Compensation Plans 14 (Dec. 10, 
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toulouse), http:// 
6
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2. Protecting Employers: Providing an Exclusive Remedy 
In exchange for the protections afforded by workers’ 
compensation acts, employees generally must abandon tort causes 
of action against employers.45 This is known as “exclusivity,” and it is 
codified in the WCA46 and enforced in case law.47 The benefit to 
employers is that, although they give up common-law defenses, they 
receive limited statutory liability and are exempt from jury 
verdicts.48 Some sources call this trade-off “quid pro quo”49 or refer 
 
www.frenchsif.org/isr/wp-content/uploads/PhD-Marco-Heimann.pdf (discussing 
how some industries even required employees to give up their right to sue for 
injury at the outset of their employment, signing contracts known as “death 
contracts” or the “worker’s right to die”). 
 44.  Although the workers’ compensation coverage of workplace injury 
claims, regardless of fault, provided a benefit to employees, there was a clear 
sacrifice made. Employees gave up the right to jury trial, forgoing the opportunity 
for a jury of peers to evaluate the case and instead abiding by statutorily 
predetermined remedies. See, e.g., Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 366 N.E.2d 1145, 
1147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (“The [Workers’s Compensation] Act took away from the 
employee the right to sue in tort in exchange for his right[s] under the Act.”). 
 45.  Thomas F. Coleman, Fundamentals of Workers’ Compensation in Minnesota, 
41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1289, 1292 (2015). There are very limited circumstances 
wherein an employee may pursue a tort cause of action. Id. 
The employee may sue the employer in tort if the employer: (1) is 
uninsured for workers’ compensation liability or fails to be self-insured 
as required by . . . [section] 176.031, (2) intentionally injures or 
assaults the employee, (3) is subject to liability under federal law (e.g., 
liability under the American [sic] with Disabilities Act), (4) is liable 
under . . . [section] 176.82 in district court, or (5) is liable under the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act. 
Id. at 1292 n.12. 
 46.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (2014) (“The liability of an employer . . . is 
exclusive and in the place of any other liability . . . .”). 
 47.  See, e.g., Kaess v. Armstrong Cork Co., 403 N.W.2d 643, 643 (Minn. 1987) 
(answering certified question and finding that the exclusive remedy provision 
within the WCA barred employee’s products liability action against employer who 
manufactured insulation containing asbestos).  
 48.  Jean C. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers’ Compensation Claim: 
The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 551 (1986); see also 
Bennett, supra note 37, at 211–12 (suggesting that the compensation system was an 
“attempt[] by corporations to reduce the costs of injury and avoid potentially 
ruinous jury verdicts”). But what is the rationale for omitting jury trials in workers’ 
compensation cases? Perhaps it is for the sake of simplicity or consistency. See 
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. 1984) (“The amount of 
compensation is limited and determined according to a definite schedule rather 
than left to the vagaries of a jury verdict.”).  
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to it as the “compensation bargain.”50 Scholars aptly point out, 
however, that this exchange of rights and remedies initially did not 
contemplate a cause of action for race-based discrimination or 
retaliatory discharge, for example.51 The exclusive remedy 
conception was limited to physical injuries.52 Minnesota courts in 
particular have been consistently unwilling to violate the exclusivity 
principle “without a clear manifestation of legislative intent to do 
so.”53 
 
 49.  Meintsma v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. 
2004) (“The exclusive remedy provision ‘is part of the quid pro quo of the workers’ 
compensation scheme . . . .’” (quoting Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 
183–84 (Minn. 1989))). 
 50.  See, e.g., City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 159 
(Ct. App. 1996).  
 51.  See Ellyn Moscowitz, Outside the “Compensation Bargain:” Protecting the Rights 
of Workers Disabled on the Job to File Suits for Disability Discrimination, 37 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 587, 594 (1997) (noting that civil rights causes of action did not even exist 
when workers’ compensation legislation was first enacted). 
 52.  See id. at 598.  
 53.  Karst, 447 N.W.2d at 185. Perhaps the most extreme example of the 
judiciary’s unwillingness to infringe on the legislature’s territory can be seen in 
McGowan v. Our Savior’s Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 842–43 (Minn. 1995). In 
McGowan, the plaintiff’s tort action for negligence against her employer was 
barred by the exclusivity principle where she had already received workers’ 
compensation benefits for the physical injuries sustained as a result of being raped 
in the workplace. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 834. This stringent adherence to the 
exclusivity principle seems to fly in the face of public policy and may explain why 
some states have a judicially created public policy exception. See infra note 90 and 
accompanying text. Although Minnesota courts did not rely on the public policy 
exception in acknowledging a right to a civil action for retaliatory discharge, other 
states have. See, e.g., Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1977) (“To accept defendant’s argument here [that the exclusivity principle 
overrides a plaintiff’s right to a retaliatory discharge action] would be to say to the 
employee, ‘Although you have no right to a tort action, you have a right to a 
workmen’s compensation claim which, while it may mean less money, is a sure 
thing. However, if you exercise that right, we will fire you.’”). 
Notably, section 176.82 of the WCA is construed narrowly. Elizabeth Raleigh 
hypothesized that it has “consistently been construed narrowly because it is the 
only part of the workers’ compensation scheme that allows an employee to recover 
damages” and that this “narrow construction is necessary to comply with the 
mandate of exclusivity.” Elizabeth A. Raleigh, A Survey of Important Decisions of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court; The 1990–1991 Term, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 262, 264 
(1992). 
8
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3. The Structure of the Workers’ Compensation System 
A predicate to understanding what makes a civil action with a 
civil jury trial so novel under the WCA is an understanding of how 
the workers’ compensation system operates—outside of civil courts 
and without jury trials.54 If an employee suffers a work-related injury 
or illness, the employer files a First Report of Injury.55 This 
commences the coverage process.56 Then, without regard to fault,57 
the employer’s insurer covers expenses such as wage loss, medical 
costs, disability benefits, and rehabilitation.58 The employee cannot 
recover damages such as pain and suffering.59 Most workers’ 
compensation cases end here, but the case may progress into 
litigation if disputes persist. 
Workers’ compensation is a branch of administrative law, so 
the dispute is not handled by the courts.60 The system is 
administered by the Workers’ Compensation Division of the 
Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.61 In a contested 
case, the employee would initiate his or her claim by filing a Claim 
Petition,62 which triggers a discovery process63 and alternative 
 
 54.  See Matheson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 297, 148 N.W. 
71, 76 (1914) (discussing how although the state constitution secures the right to 
jury trial, where employers and employees are subject to the WCA, “they thereby 
waive a jury trial . . . .”). 
 55.  Workers’ Compensation—Forms: First Report of Injury, MINN. DEP’T LABOR & 
INDUS., http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/Fr01info.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  But see Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 
FAM. L.Q. 269, 292 (1997) (“Remedial ‘no-fault’ legislation . . . is seldom truly ‘no-
fault’ in nature. . . . [N]one of these . . . laws totally abolishes or abrogates a 
defendant’s responsibility or accountability for his or her actions involving serious 
or egregious conduct.”). 
 58.  MINN. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
TRAINING FOR EMPLOYERS 8–10 (Mar. 2015), http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/Pdf 
/wc_ertrainingguide.pdf. 
 59.  MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH DEP’T, INFORMATION BRIEF: 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 2 (1998) [hereinafter INFORMATION BRIEF], http:// 
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/workcomp.pdf.  
 60.  See, e.g., OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://www.mn.gov/oah (last visited Feb. 
8, 2016). 
 61.  MINN. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DIVISION 
PROFILE 1 (2011), http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/Pdf/wcadminprofile.pdf.  
 62.  MINN. STAT. § 176.271 (2014) (“[A]ll proceedings under this chapter are 
initiated by the filing of a written petition on a prescribed form.”).  
 63.  Workers’ Compensation: Litigation Process, MINN. DEP’T LABOR & INDUS., 
9
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dispute resolution.64 If the matter does not settle, there is a hearing 
before a compensation judge65 at the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.66 These judges are not bound by traditional procedural 
or evidentiary rules.67 After the judge issues a decision, the parties 
can appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals68 and 
ultimately the Minnesota Supreme Court.69 
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system provides a 
streamlined administrative process, which aims to avoid the delays 
of traditional litigation and the inconsistencies of jury verdicts.70 
This structure, however, is geared towards straightforward personal 
injury cases.71 The WCA provides tidy numerical formulas72 to 
compensate a worker who loses a leg73 or is exposed to toxic 
chemicals in the workplace.74 The WCA does not contemplate, let 
alone calculate, the precise value of an intangible injury like 
retaliatory discharge.75 
 
http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/FaqLitigation.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).  
 64.  Workers’ Compensation: Alternative Dispute-Resolution Services, MINN. DEP’T 
LABOR & INDUS., http://www.dli.mn.gov/WC/DispRes.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 
2016).  
 65.  MINN. STAT. § 176.341. 
 66.  INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 59, at 7. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  MINN. STAT. § 176.421.  
 69.  INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 59, at 10.  
 70.  Id. (noting the uncertainty and unpredictability of the tort system for 
employees and employers alike). 
 71.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.001 (referencing “the quick and efficient delivery of 
indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers” (emphasis added)).  
 72.  See, e.g., id. § 176.101 (setting forth the compensation schedule, 
calculating weekly wages, valuing impairment ratings, etc.).  
 73.  The WCA provides coverage for “personal injury,” which encompasses 
both mental impairments and physical injuries that “aris[e] out of and in the 
course of employment.” Id. § 176.011, subdiv. 16.  
 74.  See id. § 176.66 (“The disablement of an employee resulting from an 
occupational disease shall be regarded as a personal injury within the meaning of 
the workers’ compensation law.”).  
 75.  See id. § 176.001 (describing the intent of the legislature “to assure the 
quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers 
at a reasonable cost to the employers,” without any mention of or allusion to 
compensating employees for non-physical problems).  
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 19
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/19
13 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:59 PM 
456 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:446 
C. Retaliatory Discharge: An Evolving Cause of Action 
In addition to providing relief for on-the-job injuries, 
Minnesota’s WCA contains a special provision in section 176.82 
that prohibits employers from discharging an employee for seeking 
workers’ compensation benefits.76 This prohibition on retaliatory 
discharge77 was enacted in 1975 and remains in effect today.78 The 
statute creates an “action for civil damages,”79 echoing other 
statutory rights of Minnesota employees to file civil suits for 
retaliatory discharge.80 Because retaliatory discharge is the heart of 
section 176.82 claims, this note will briefly explore the history of 
the cause of action generally81 as well as its development in the 
workers’ compensation context specifically.82 
1. Retaliatory Discharge Generally 
Nowadays, retaliatory discharge causes of action are 
ubiquitous. For example, we take for granted that an employee 
cannot be fired for his or her race, sexuality, or age. However, the 
retaliatory discharge doctrine is a relatively recent development. In 
1959, the groundbreaking California case of Petermann v. 
International Brotherhood83 held that an employer’s right to discharge 
an employee could be limited by statute or through considerations 
of public policy.84 Prior to Petermann, the employment-at-will 
doctrine prevailed, giving employers a great deal of discretion in 
terminating employment relationships without much, if any, 
 
 76.  Id. § 176.82, subdiv. 1.  
 77.  While the terms retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination are 
sometimes conflated, this case note relies on the more specific term “retaliatory 
discharge” to describe employees who are fired in retaliation for some particular 
act or refusal to act. See Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 352 (Minn. 
2002) (calling retaliatory discharge “one type of wrongful discharge”). 
 78.  Law of June 4, 1975, ch. 359, § 21, 1975 Minn. Laws 1188 (current 
version at MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1).  
 79.  MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1.  
 80.  See, e.g., id. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1) (retaliation for whistleblowing); id.      
§ 181.941, subdiv. 3 (retaliation for requesting parenting leave); id. § 181.9456, 
subdiv. 3 (retaliation for leave for organ donation); id. § 182.65, subdiv. 2(b)(9) 
(retaliation for making occupational safety and health complaint).  
 81.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 82.  See infra Part II.C.2.  
 83.  344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).  
 84.  Id. at 27 (finding that employer could not fire employee for employee’s 
refusal to commit perjury).  
11
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oversight from the legislature or the judiciary.85 Although it was a 
landmark decision, Petermann “stood alone and ignored for many 
years.”86 It was not until the 1980s that Minnesota courts began to 
carve away at the employment-at-will doctrine.87 
The exceptions to at-will employment are either grounded in 
common law or enacted by statute.88 The overwhelming majority of 
states89 have what is known as a public policy exception90 to the at-
 
 85.  Minnesota’s employment-at-will doctrine is generally traced to Skagerberg 
v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 302, 266 N.W. 872, 877 (1936). The general 
rule set out in Skagerberg is that employment “may be terminated by either party at 
any time, and no action can be sustained in such case for a wrongful discharge.” 
Id. The employer can fire an employee “for a good reason, for a bad reason, or for 
no reason at all.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 156 (Minn. 
2014) (Wright. J., dissenting) (citing Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minn. 
Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 2002)). Despite a growing number of 
causes of action for retaliatory discharge or workplace discrimination, the Eighth 
Circuit is still reluctant for courts to become overinvolved in employee-employer 
relations. See, e.g., Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 
1995) (“[T]he employment discrimination laws have not vested in the federal 
courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or 
fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that 
those judgments involve intentional discrimination.”).  
 86.  R. Scott Oswald & Michael Vogelsang Jr., The ABCs of Common Law 
Wrongful Termination Claims in the Washington Metropolitan Region, 3 LAB. & EMP. L.F. 
197, 200 (2013). 
 87.  See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629–30 (Minn. 
1983) (“[W]here an employment contract is for an indefinite duration, such 
indefiniteness by itself does not preclude handbook provisions on job security 
from being enforceable . . . .”). Nonetheless, the default presumption is still 
employment at-will: “The usual employer-employee relationship is terminable at 
the will of either . . . .” Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 
N.W.2d 213, 221 (1962); see, e.g., Ring v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 
1130, 1134 (D. Minn. 2003) (“Minnesota law preserves the long-standing 
presumption of at-will employment, under which an employer can dismiss an 
employee hired for an indefinite term at any time. Likewise, the employee is free 
to terminate their employment at any time.”).  
 88.  Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment 
in Retaliation for Filing Workers’ Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1221 (2015).  
 89.  Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 159 (Minn. 2014) (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.07 (5th ed. Supp. 
2013) (surveying states)).  
 90.  There is no universal agreement on the proper definition of “public 
policy.” The Petermann court, which adopted the public policy exception, explicitly 
noted that the term is “inherently not subject to precise definition.” Petermann v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters of Am., Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. 1959). The Illinois 
Supreme Court attempted to pin down this nebulous concept:  
12
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will presumption, a catchall cause of action that “arises every time 
an employee’s termination results from an employer’s violation of a 
clear mandate of public policy.”91 Minnesota, however, has not 
embraced—either judicially or legislatively—this public policy 
exception.92 
 
[P]ublic policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the 
citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State’s 
constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial 
decisions. Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing 
matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely 
personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory 
discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s 
social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed  
. . . . The cause of action is allowed where the public policy is clear, but 
is denied where it is equally clear that only private interests are at stake. 
Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878–79 (Ill. 1981) (compiling 
cases nationwide where retaliatory discharge for violation of public policy has 
either been allowed or disallowed). The sources of public policy might include 
administrative agency rules, industry standards, codes of conduct, or even ethical 
codes. Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the 
Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D. L. 
REV. 63, 73–74 (1989).  
 91.  Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 151.  
 92.  Sarah C. Steefel, Case Note, Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 
622 (Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 463, 474–75 (1984). In Phipps v. Clark Oil & 
Refining Corp., the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the public policy exception 
to be “persuasive” and announced that an employer “is liable if an employee is 
discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy.” 396 
N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). After the Minnesota Supreme Court 
granted review, but before it released its decision, the legislature announced the 
Whistleblower Act. See Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 352 (Minn. 
2002) (recounting history of the contemplated public policy exception). As such, 
the court no longer had to answer the policy-level question of whether or not to 
recognize a common-law action for wrongful discharge. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571. 
The Dukowitz case, decided before Schmitz in early 2014, revisited the public 
policy exception issue. Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 148–49. The court again addressed 
the question in the context of a plaintiff terminated after applying for 
unemployment benefits and once again, the court declined to recognize a public 
policy exception. Id. at 148–49. The Dukowitz court was loath to legislate from the 
bench and usurp legislative power. See id. at 151–52. They exercised judicial 
restraint based on a confidence that “the legislative process[] is equipped to 
balance the competing interests of employers, employees, and the public.” Id. at 
153–54. This deference to the legislative branch is particularly important in 
relation to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis of legislative. See infra Part 
IV.C.  
13
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Instead of establishing a blanket prohibition on retaliatory 
discharge in the form of a public policy exception, the Minnesota 
legislature has enacted specific statutes, such as section 176.82, 
which carve out exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.93 
Conceptually, if the original employment-at-will doctrine were a 
slice of cheese, these carve-outs for retaliatory discharge would 
convert the slice into Swiss cheese. Although Minnesota courts still 
refer to employment at-will as the rule of thumb,94 the profusion of 
exceptions (the holes in the Swiss cheese) has engulfed the rule. 
There are now so many exceptions that the exceptions have 
essentially become the rule. 
The prima facie case for retaliatory discharge, whether a 
common-law or statutory cause of action, is the same: the employee 
must be exercising a constitutional or statutory right, the employee 
must have been discharged, and there must be a causal relationship 
between the aforementioned right and dismissal.95 In Minnesota, if 
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to 
the defendant to furnish a non-retaliatory motivation for the 
discharge; if this burden is satisfied, the burden bounces back to 
the plaintiff to show that the non-retaliatory motive is pretextual.96 
2. Retaliatory Discharge in the Workers’ Compensation Context 
The first recognition97 of retaliatory discharge for exercising 
workers’ compensation rights came in 1973 with the Indiana case 
 
 93.  Steefel, supra note 92, at 474 (compiling statutes that “create specific 
public policy limitations to the general rule”); see also McDaniel v. United 
Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn. 1991) (clarifying that section 
176.82 is “not a codification of the common law” but rather an independent 
statutory cause of action enacted “more than a decade before this court 
recognized a common law action for retaliatory discharge”).  
 94.  See, e.g., Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 150 (stating that “the employer-
employee relationship is generally at-will”). 
 95.  Love, supra note 48, at 566–67. 
 96.  This burden shifting standard, familiar to most employment lawyers, is 
known as the McDonnell Douglas standard. See Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
472 N.W.2d 114, 119 n.7 (Minn. 1991) (“The three-step McDonnell Douglas test 
must be used in analyzing a retaliatory discharge claim.”) (citation omitted). The 
McDonnell Douglas standard applies to common-law and statutory claims alike. See 
Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Minn. 1987) (common-
law wrongful discharge claim); Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427–
28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (statutory wrongful discharge claim). 
 97.  Some sources incorrectly suggest that “[t]he retaliatory discharge cause 
14
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Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.98 It was shortly thereafter that 
Minnesota passed section 176.82.99 Some legal scholars opined that 
this was a long time coming,100 but prior to 1973, several courts had 
declined to recognize the workers’ compensation variety of 
retaliatory discharge.101 
Approximately forty percent of the states recognize a similar 
cause of action today.102 Where courts were reluctant to 
 
of action was initially devised by the courts to protect individuals filing for workers’ 
compensation.” Nancy K. Renfer, Corporate Counsels’ Lack of Retaliatory Discharge 
Action, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 92 (1989). Yet, retaliatory discharge was recognized 
in other settings before it was extended to the workers’ compensation context. See 
supra in Part II.C.1. It is more accurate to state that “[o]ne of the first bases for 
successful wrongful termination claims was in a workers’ compensation [context].” 
Oswald & Vogelsang, supra note 86, at 200. Nonetheless, this extension to workers’ 
compensation was surely logical. After all, what good are the statutory protections 
of a workers’ compensation act if employees can be terminated for asserting those 
rights?  
 98.  297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973) (“Prior to workmen’s compensation, 
workers were faced with the harshness of the common law. The employee’s only 
remedy was an action in tort against the employer—actions which were rarely 
successful . . . . Workmen’s compensation statutes are in derogation of the 
common law and provide, for those covered, an exclusive remedy for injuries 
sustained ‘in the course of’ and ‘arising out of’ one’s employment.”). 
 99.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  
 100.  6 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION §§ 104–53 
(2000) (“It is odd that such a decision was so long in coming.”). Other 
commentators remarked on the timing of Frampton and speculated that perhaps 
Congress’ recognition of a retaliatory discharge action in Title VII “paved the way” 
for Frampton’s recognition of retaliatory discharge the workers’ compensation 
setting. Love, supra note 48, at 554.  
 101.  See, e.g., Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 
1961); Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956); Raley v. Darling Shop, 59 
S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1950). The courts’ rationale for rejecting this new cause of action 
was often judicial deference and a commitment to exclusivity of workers’ 
compensation acts—the same principle that causes Minnesota courts today to be 
hesitant to recognize a broad public policy exception for retaliatory discharge. See, 
e.g., Christy, 295 S.W.2d at 127 (“We can hardly conceive of the legislature making 
such careful provision for the rights and compensation of injured employees 
covered by the Act and yet omitting a specific provision for recovery of damages 
for wrongful discharge if there had been any intent to create such a right.”).  
 102.  See 3 MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 311:3, nn.14–15, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2015) (compiling cases and statutes from nineteen states 
which provide a civil remedy for plaintiffs discharged in retaliation for asserting 
their workers’ compensation rights). In approximately two-thirds of the states that 
recognize the cause of action, the source of the civil action is codified in a statute. 
See id. (outlining seventeen statutes and two cases). See generally Theresa Ludwig 
15
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acknowledge a common-law cause of action, the legislatures would 
authorize civil remedies.103 Though the language of Minnesota’s 
statute calls for a “civil action,” it does not specifically invoke the 
right to a “civil jury trial.”104 There is a missing link between civil 
action and civil jury trial, and it is in this liminal space that Schmitz 
is situated. 
3. Jury Trials in Retaliatory Discharge Actions Generally 
Jury trials in other, non-WCA retaliation cases are also relevant 
to the historical background.105 In Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that employees had a 
constitutional right to a jury trial on their statutory wrongful 
discharge claims under the Whistleblower Act and Minnesota’s 
Occupational Safety and Health Act.106 The Abraham court traced 
the origins of wrongful discharge claims, which were historically 
tried to juries,107 and found that the plaintiff’s statutory retaliatory 
discharge claims, as a subcategory of wrongful discharge claims 
generally, had an attendant right to a jury trial.108 Although the 
court may not have realized the long-term impact of this holding, 
 
Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing 
Workers’ Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1221 (2015) (collecting cases in which 
courts consider the retaliatory discharge in the workers’ compensation context).  
Notably, this issue of retaliatory discharge is generally seen as a state issue. 
Although certain employment law is legislated at a federal level, workers’ 
compensation has been left to the states. There are less than a dozen cases at the 
Supreme Court involving retaliatory discharge in the context of workers’ 
compensation benefits, and the Court’s decisions generally emphasize deference 
to these state-run systems. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 
U.S. 399, 411 (1988) (portraying the state law tort action for retaliatory discharge 
in workers’ compensation context as a “separate font[] of substantive rights” that 
should not be preempted by other federal labor laws). But see, e.g., Metro Live Ins. 
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 61 (1987) (finding state retaliatory discharge claim to 
be preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). 
 103.  See Love, supra note 48, at 559.  
 104.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (2014).  
 105.  For an interesting discussion of the uniqueness of retaliation claims, see 
David Sherwyn et al., Experimental Evidence That Retaliation Claims Are Unlike Other 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 455, 475–86 (2014).  
 106.  639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002) (involving claims for retaliatory 
discharge under Whistleblower Act and Minnesota Occupational Safety and 
Health Act).  
 107.  Id. at 350–51.  
 108.  Id. at 352–54.  
16
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practitioners hypothesized that the logical extension of Abraham 
would entitle other retaliation plaintiffs to jury trials as well.109 
D. Jury Trials for Workers’ Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Cases 
The previous three sections—dealing with jury trials, workers’ 
compensation, and retaliatory discharge—can now be woven 
together into the matter at issue in Schmitz: jury trials in retaliatory 
discharge claims under the WCA. 
Nationwide, many of the early workers’ compensation 
retaliatory discharge cases involved jury trials.110 But because 
Minnesota’s statute does not explicitly mention jury trial, 
Minnesota courts struggled to interpret the meaning of “civil 
action.” The earliest Minnesota cases involving section 176.82 
claims never delved into the jury trial issue, resolving the 
controversies on other grounds111 or by bench trial.112 In 1987, the 
 
 109.  Peter Gray & Andrew E. Tanick, Fresh Incentives to Whistle While You Work: 
Whistleblower Claims After the Abraham and Anderson-Johanningmeier Cases, BENCH 
& B. MINN., Apr. 2002, at 23, 24 (“Extended to its logical conclusion, the Abraham 
holding indicates that plaintiffs seeking damages only under these [discrimination 
and retaliation] statutes are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in state court—
regardless of any contrary statutory provisions which, naturally, must give way to 
the superior weight of constitutional law.”). In a way, it seems like some of these 
practitioners may have seen Schmitz coming down the pike a decade before the 
Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari. See id. (mentioning an impending 
“across-the-board expansion of the Minnesota wrongful discharge law”).  
 110.  Interestingly, many of these juries were very plaintiff-friendly. See, e.g., 
Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 663, 667 (Ct. App. 1984) (jury verdict 
in favor of employee); Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983) (“The jury found for Meadows and 
assessed damages.”); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1983) (jury verdict of $7,500 in actual damages and $17,500 in punitive damages); 
Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 695 (W. Va. 1982) (jury 
verdict of $40,000). 
 111.  See, e.g., Morales v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 
(D. Minn. 1979) (finding temporal issue fatal to section 176.82 claims where 
employee filed workers’ compensation claim nine months after discharge); 
Wojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (permitting 
employer to obtain insurance coverage for section 176.82 claims); Schuyler v. 
Metro. Transit Comm’n, 374 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissing 
employee’s section 176.82 claims because employee failed to exhaust remedies in 
collective bargaining agreement).  
 112.  See, e.g., Jensen v. Hercules, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (bench trial); Randall v. N. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he case tried to the court without a jury.”).  
17
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Minnesota Supreme Court answered a certified question and held 
that a civil action brought under section 176.82 did not merge with 
a workers’ compensation action for penalties under section 176.225 
of the WCA.113 At this juncture, all that was clear was that section 
176.82 cases were civil actions that belonged in district court rather 
than the administrative workers’ compensation realm. 
Minnesota courts then entered an era in the early 1990s where 
they inexplicably began withholding jury trials in actions arising 
under section 176.82.114 In 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
intervened and indicated that a section 176.82 retaliatory discharge 
action was a common-law cause of action “outside the purview” of 
the WCA,115 suggesting that the lower courts had been incorrect to 
deny plaintiffs jury trials.116 This gave rise to passive acceptance of 
jury trials in section 176.82 cases117 and eventually affirmative 
support of the same.118 
Although generally workers’ compensation claims are resolved 
by quasi-judicial compensation judges,119 Minnesota courts have 
found a civil right to jury trial in other cases that originate in the 
WCA, namely certain subrogation claims.120 It would therefore be a 
 
 113.  Kaluza v. Home Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 230, 235 (Minn. 1987). This case is 
particularly relevant in that Kaluza passively acknowledges the separateness of the 
section 176.82 civil action from other actions arising under the WCA. Accord 
Bergeson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 414 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 1987) (portraying 
section 176.82 action as a “separate and distinguishable” remedy, which still “gives 
due deference to the exclusivity scheme of the [WCA]”).  
 114.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Snap-On Tools, Inc., No. C8-93-1011, 1994 WL 6843, 
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1994) (“Anderson was not entitled to a jury trial 
because his asserted claims fall under Minn. Stat. § 176.82.”); Snesrud v. Instant 
Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a jury trial 
was not required because there was no underlying common-law cause of action); 
Flaherty v. Lindsay, 457 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“Minn. Stat.        
§ 176.82 does not specifically provide for a jury trial.”). 
 115.  Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1995).  
 116.  See id. 
 117.  See, e.g., Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997) (discussing a retaliatory discharge jury instruction).  
 118.  See, e.g., Brenden v. Westonka Pub. Sch., No. EM03-017571, 2005 WL 
1936195, at *8 (D. Minn. June 10, 2005). 
 119.  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.  
 120.  See Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1993). 
But see Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 680 n.1 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., dissenting) 
(“In Tyroll, the employer’s right to subrogation, not the actual cause of action, was 
found in the [WCA]. This is a far different position than the case . . . in which the 
cause of action itself . . . was established by the WCA.”). 
18
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mischaracterization to say that absolutely no right to jury trial exists 
for any claim connected to the WCA. Nonetheless, the default is 
still that WCA claims are resolved by a compensation judge, not a 
jury.121 
Across this timeline, though, it is at least clear that the 
workers’ compensation courts understood a section 176.82 civil 
action to mean a case within district court, separate from the 
administrative proceedings for on-the-job injuries.122 The very 
limited commentary on the subject from the Workers’ 
Compensation Court of Appeals on the matter makes no remark 
one way or the other as to whether a section 176.82 civil action 
implicates a civil jury trial.123 
 
 121.  See supra Part II.B.  
 122.  This author searched the archives of the Workers’ Compensation Court 
of Appeals (WCCA) in Minnesota for any and all decisions involving the term 
“176.82” to see how the WCCA perceived these claims. The court consistently 
acknowledged that such claims are venued in district court, not the workers’ 
compensation system. See Stange v. Dep’t of Transp., No. WC05-101, 2005 WL 
3451183, at *12 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005) (stating that the 
WCCA “ha[d] appellate jurisdiction only, and ha[d] no authority to act” on 
employee’s request for review of alleged retaliatory discharge under section 
176.82); Weidler v. Johanning Trans-Fare, Inc., No. WC05-147, 2005 WL 1901570, 
at *3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. June 30, 2005) (indicating that where a 
settlement foreclosed the possibility of section 176.82 claim, “the enforceability of 
such a closeout is to be determined by the district courts as opposed to the 
[WCCA]”); Smith v. Receivable Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 2003 WL 783815, at *2 n.1 
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (“The civil penalties and punitive 
damages permitted under . . . § 176.82 . . . are arguably nonworkers’ 
compensation benefits, although they are referenced under our statute.”).  
 123.  See supra note 122. What is interesting about this is that section 175A.01 
states that the WCCA has jurisdiction over cases “aris[ing] under the workers’ 
compensation laws of the state.” MINN. STAT. § 175A.01 (2014). This creates 
jurisdictional tension, as the retaliatory discharge statute simultaneously arises 
within the WCA (where compensation judges have jurisdiction) while providing 
for a separate civil action in district court (where the compensation judges would 
not have jurisdiction). As a WCCA judge and staff attorney hinted after the 1995 
amendments to section 176.82, more questions would “doubtless arise” from this 
tricky subdivision: “Must a compensation judge consider this issue when 
appropriate, and will findings in a workers’ compensation proceeding have any 
impact on a subsequent civil action?” Johnson & Wasson, supra note 35, at 1532.  
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III. THE SCHMITZ DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Plaintiff Darrel Schmitz, who worked as a mechanic for U.S. 
Steel, first injured his back at work in October 2006.124 He initially 
did not file a worker’s compensation claim because a supervisor 
allegedly threatened to fire him if he did.125 When a back injury at 
home in December 2006 exacerbated his troubles, Schmitz filed a 
claim in April 2007.126 He was unable to work until October 2007, 
and even then he was given work restrictions.127 U.S. Steel made no 
effort to allow Schmitz to return to work within his restrictions, 
ultimately terminating him in January 2008.128 
Schmitz subsequently filed suit in May 2008.129 He alleged that 
U.S. Steel discharged him in retaliation for seeking workers’ 
compensation benefits, in violation of section 176.82, subdivision 1. 
He further alleged that U.S. Steel refused to offer him continued 
employment, in violation of subdivision 2.130 
The case had a somewhat complicated history in the lower 
courts.131 The district court initially granted summary judgment on 
all claims in favor of the defendant, U.S. Steel.132 The court of 
appeals reversed in part, permitting Schmitz’s claims for retaliatory 
discharge under the WCA to proceed.133 
On remand, Schmitz amended his complaint to add a third 
claim under section 176.82 for threatening to discharge him in 
violation of subdivision 1.134 The district court denied his demand 
 
 124.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Minn. 2014). 
 125.  Id.; see also Appellee’s Brief & Addendum at 1–2, Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 
669 (No. A12-0709), 2013 WL 9670848, at *4.  
 126.  Appellee’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 125, at 2. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 8–9.  
 129.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 671.  
 130.  Id. at 671–72; see also Appellee’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 125, at 1. 
 131.  See Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 1, Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669 (No. 
A12-0709), 2013 WL 9670847, at *1 (providing a timeline of relevant procedural 
history).  
 132.  In addition to bringing claims under section 176.82 of the WCA, plaintiff 
asserted a disability discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 
Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 672. 
 133.  Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Schmitz I), No. A10-0633, 2010 WL 4941668, 
at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010). 
 134.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 672.  
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for jury trial on the three section 176.82 claims he had accrued.135 
After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of Schmitz on 
this recently added threat-to-discharge claim, but rejected his 
retaliatory discharge and refusal-to-offer-continued-employment 
claims.136 
Both parties cross-appealed.137 The court of appeals then 
reversed in part, finding in relevant part that the retaliatory 
discharge claims were entitled to a jury trial because they sought 
only money damages, making them legal rather than equitable.138 
Defendant appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted 
review to assess whether Schmitz had a right to a jury trial on his 
WCA retaliatory discharge claims.139 
B. The Majority Opinion: Affirming Abraham and Clarifying 
Breimhorst 
The right to a jury trial must either originate in the Minnesota 
Constitution or in the express language of a statute.140 Admittedly, 
the language of section 176.82 makes no explicit provision for a 
“civil jury trial.”141 To the Schmitz court, this was straightforward as 
can be: “The right to a jury trial . . . must arise from the Minnesota 
Constitution.”142 Regrettably, there was not even a cursory 
discussion of the fact that the statute did not expressly provide for a 
jury trial. There was also no consideration of the alternative—that 
 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. The district court awarded Schmitz $15,000 in damages for emotional 
distress; it further granted his motion for attorney fees in part, awarding an 
additional $203,112. Id.  
 137.  Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Schmitz II), 831 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2013).  
 138.  Id. at 677. 
 139.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 670. The Minnesota Supreme Court also 
addressed a secondary issue on appeal—whether an employer may assert a 
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to vicarious liability for threat to discharge 
claims—which will not be discussed. See id. at 677–78. The court, “[p]roviding no 
additional comment,” ultimately declined to extend the Faragher/Ellerth defense 
beyond sexual harassment claims. Stephen F. Befort, Retaliatory Discharge/Workers’ 
Compensation: Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp. 852 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2014), in THE 
41ST ANNUAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 16 (2014). 
 140.  Ewert v. City of Winthrop, 278 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 1979).  
 141.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (2014). 
 142.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 673 (“[T]he right to a jury trial in this case, if it 
exists, must arise from the Minnesota Constitution.”).  
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perhaps the statute did intend to provide for a jury trial, even if it 
did so implicitly rather than explicitly.143 
Schmitz pursued the constitutional argument, asserting that 
because his claim was legal in nature (seeking monetary damages 
instead of equitable relief), he was entitled to a jury trial.144 U.S. 
Steel pursued a statutory argument, maintaining that the 
legislature precluded the right to jury trial when it created a new 
set of rights and remedies under the WCA.145 
The court ultimately sided with Schmitz and pursued a purely 
precedential argument.146 The majority affirmed the continuing 
validity of Abraham, the analogous case involving retaliatory 
discharge under the Whistleblower Act.147 Abraham had classified 
retaliatory discharge claims as actions at law that deserved jury 
trial.148 In other words, even if a statute fails to codify the right to 
jury trial, the constitutional right to jury trial kicks in when the 
statutory cause of action is legal in nature.149 
The court further clarified the meaning of Breimhorst v. 
Beckman,150 a 1949 case that U.S. Steel relied upon for the 
exclusivity proposition.151 In that case, the plaintiff argued that the 
WCA was void for denying her right to a jury trial on her personal 
injury claims.152 The Breimhorst court disagreed, finding that the 
WCA gave her an adequate substitute remedy despite depriving her 
of a jury trial.153 In essence, Breimhorst stood for the adequacy of the 
 
 143.  See id. (“Section 176.82 does not expressly provide such a right.”).  
 144.  Appellee’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 125, at 11–12.  
 145.  Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 131, at 11–12.  
 146.  See Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 674–77.  
 147.  Befort, supra note 139, at 16.  
 148.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 676; see supra Part II.C.3 (discussing Abraham); 
see also Befort, supra note 139, at 16 (“The court determined that there was no 
reason to treat Schmitz’s retaliatory discharge claim any differently [than the 
retaliatory discharge claim in Abraham].”).  
 149.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 676–77 (“When a statutory cause of action is 
legal in nature . . . there is a constitutional right to jury trial. . . . [T]he right to a 
jury trial applies to all causes of action at law, regardless of whether the legislature 
has codified the cause of action.” (quoting Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 
N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002))).  
 150.  Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).  
 151.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 674 (framing Defendant’s reliance on 
Breimhorst as support for the “contention that a section 176.82 retaliatory discharge 
claim is part and parcel of the WCA’s comprehensive statutory scheme”).  
 152.  Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 434, 35 N.W.2d at 735.  
 153.  Id. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 736 (“[W]e cannot say that the workmen’s 
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exclusive remedy and the permissibility of disposing of jury trials in 
the workers’ compensation context. The Schmitz court found this 
inapposite in the instant matter, as the retaliatory discharge 
damages were distinguishable from the workers’ compensation 
benefits pursued in Breimhorst.154 The court found that the 
fundamental sameness between section 176.82 retaliatory discharge 
claims and common-law retaliatory discharge overrode the 
exclusivity principle.155 
The court’s analysis ended with a brief plain language 
argument.156 The court stated that civil actions are litigated in 
district court, so they are inherently beyond the exclusivity of the 
workers’ compensation system that deprives plaintiffs of jury 
trials.157 The opinion avoided further statutory considerations and 
seemingly jumped to the conclusion that the civil action described 
 
compensation act has not given plaintiff an adequate substitute remedy.”). One 
central component of the Breimhorst holding was that when the legislature replaces 
a common-law cause of action, which formerly involved the right to jury trial, with 
a “new, adequate, and fundamentally different remedy,” then “the legislature may 
withhold the right of jury trial.” Id. at 411–12, 35 N.W.2d at 723. 
 154.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 675 (calling Breimhorst’s claims “completely 
different” from Schmitz’s); see also Befort, supra note 139, at 16 (“The court was 
careful to differentiate Schmitz’s retaliatory discharge claim from general claims 
for workers’ benefits that do not create an entitlement to a jury trial.”).  
 155.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 675–76 (“Breimhorst does not support the 
concurrence and dissent’s position. There, the cause of action was new, adequate, 
and fundamentally different, but here the retaliatory discharge cause of action, 
while new to workers’ compensation, is not fundamentally different than such 
causes of action under the common law. In actuality, it is fundamentally the 
same.”).  
 156.  The court devotes a mere paragraph to the plain language 
considerations. See id. at 677; cf. David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 97, 97 (2013) (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly 
emphasizes plain language and evades analysis of statutory purpose). Because the 
court concluded the language was plain and the meaning straightforward, the 
majority did not engage in statutory analysis to decipher the significance of “civil 
action” or speculate on the legislative purpose. See Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 677.  
 157.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 677. Even this characterization of the court’s 
holding involves some gap filling. Technically speaking, the court never links this 
exclusivity issue with the jury trial issue. See id. (“[C]ivil actions, which are litigated 
in district court, are outside the workers’ compensation system and damages 
awarded on the claim do not constitute workers’ compensation benefits.”). If 
anything, the court’s limited statutory interpretation is for the sake of concluding 
that exclusivity does not govern. 
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in section 176.82 enjoys an inherent, concomitant right to a civil 
jury trial based on precedent alone.158 
C. Justice Anderson’s Dissent 
Justice Anderson dissented in part, joined by Chief Justice 
Gildea and Justice Dietzen.159 The dissenters thought the salient 
consideration was that the cause of action arose under the 
umbrella of the comprehensive workers’ compensation scheme, 
which generally involves no right to a jury trial.160 The dissent 
focused on the fact that the legislature did not explicitly provide 
for a “jury trial.”161 While the majority saw section 176.82 as 
expanding remedies available to plaintiffs beyond the bounds of 
the WCA,162 the dissent instead saw this statutory retaliatory 
discharge action as a “unique remedy” constrained to the WCA.163 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Although the court ultimately came to the correct conclusion, 
it neglected a meaningful avenue of analysis: statutory 
interpretation.164 The majority’s heavy reliance on case law alone 
was misplaced considering the tumultuous history of inconsistent 
treatment of section 176.92 claims.165 To clarify conflicting case law 
and more effectively compensate for the ambiguities in the WCA, 
the court could have engaged in statutory interpretation in 
addition to its analysis of precedent.166 
 
 158.  See id. at 674.  
 159.  See id. at 678–83 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 160.  Id. at 678.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Practitioners have hypothesized that expanding retaliatory discharge 
claims to district court may also expand the number of claims brought by 
plaintiffs. Minnesota State Supreme Court Finds Right to Jury Trial for Worker 
Compensation Retaliation Claims, 30 TERMINATION EMP. BULL. no. 10, Oct. 2014.  
 163.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d at 681 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 164.  See John E. Simonett, Rules of Statutory Construction and the Florida Election 
Law, BENCH & B., July 2001, at 31, 33, http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar 
/2001/jul01/essay.htm (“[I]f the meaning of a statute is at issue, apply those 
interpretive canons that are appropriate to the situation to arrive at a meaning 
that is reasonable, honest with the language, and true to the statute’s purpose.”).  
 165.  See supra notes 113–20 and accompanying text.  
 166.  See 3B NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 75:3 (7th ed. 2011) (“Courts construing workers’ 
compensation statutes, federal and state, employ the usual maxims of construction 
24
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Admittedly, the Ewert standard (providing that “[t]he right to a 
jury trial must be found either in the Minnesota Constitution or 
provided specifically by statute”) would seem to suggest that the 
constitutional route of analysis is appropriate in Schmitz because the 
statute does not explicitly provide for jury trial. While legally sound 
in theory, this Ewert standard is unworkable in practice. First and 
foremost, it presupposes that legislators know about the Ewert 
framework for jury trials. It further expects legislators to use magic 
words to provide for jury trials.167 Although the separation of 
powers between the legislative and judicial branches provides 
checks and balances, it does little to ensure a mutual 
understanding of statutory construction and interpretation. 
Because the bifurcated Ewert standard is challenging for the 
legislature to apply, it is correspondingly problematic for the 
judiciary to rely on it. Setting the Ewert framework aside, statutory 
interpretation would have been a viable means to resolve the 
question of whether the legislature intended to provide for a jury 
trial in section 176.82 claims. 
This section begins by establishing why it was an error for the 
court to gloss over the ambiguity of the term “civil action.”168 It will 
then briefly explore two textual canons of construction169 that 
would have been particularly useful here: noscitur a sociis170 and lex 
specialis.171 Finally, this note applies Justice Breyer’s purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation to Schmitz in an effort to 
incorporate the complex legislative purposes that lurk beneath the 
allegedly plain language of section 176.82.172 
 
. . . .”). But cf. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950), 
(finding “two opposing canons on almost every point.”).  
 167.  But see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.89, subdiv. 2 (2014) (“A person charged 
with a petty misdemeanor is not entitled to a jury trial but shall be tried by a judge 
without a jury.”); Id. § 117.165, subdiv. 1 (“In all eminent domain proceedings . . . 
the petitioner shall be entitled to a jury trial.”); Id. § 260B.163 (providing some 
juvenile hearings “shall be without a jury” whereas others include “the right to a 
jury trial on the issue of guilt.”); Id. § 611A.79, subdiv. 5 (“The right to trial by jury 
is preserved in an action brought under this section.”).  
 168.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 169.  “[C]anons of construction are never the masters of the courts, but merely 
their servants, to aid them in ascertaining the legislative intent.” Ott v. Great N. Ry. 
Co., 70 Minn. 50, 55, 72 N.W. 833, 834 (1897) (Mitchell, J., dissenting).  
 170.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 171.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 172.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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A. The Court Erred in Finding Plain Meaning 
If the meaning of a statute is plain in its language, then courts 
need not engage in statutory interpretation;173 rather, they must 
simply enforce the words of the statute as written.174 Though the 
majority opinion devotes one paragraph to contemplating the plain 
language of the statute, it does little more than raise the issue and 
quickly conclude that civil actions, litigated in district court, are 
outside the workers’ compensation system.175 By only using the 
language of the statute to interpret the exclusivity issue, the court 
misses a meaningful opportunity to see what the statute’s language 
might indicate about the jury trial issue. 
Clearly the meaning of section 176.82 is not as plain176 as the 
court makes it out to be.177 After all, for nearly forty-five years 
 
 173.  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings 
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 
1065–67 (2001) (providing an overview of statutory interpretation methods from 
1500 to present).  
 174.  Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 175.  Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Minn. 2014) (citing Karnes v. Quality 
Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1995)).  
 176.  Surely the legislature could have more carefully drafted section 176.82 to 
explicitly provide for both a “civil action” and a “civil jury trial.” See Paul J. Zech, 
Federal Pre-Emption and State Exclusive Remedy Issues in Employment Litigation, 72 N.D. 
L. REV. 325, 347 (1996) (“Significant rights and defenses relating to employment 
should not be left to succeed or fail based on needless judicial harmonizing of 
statutes which could have been avoided merely by proper drafting and review of 
the policy considerations behind the legislation.”). But, since the legislation itself 
was unclear, the court should have embraced the ambiguity and engaged in 
“judicial harmonizing of the statutes.” See id.  
 177.  This is not the first time that the Minnesota Supreme Court “took the 
easy way out” and glazed over ambiguities in favor of finding plain meaning. See, 
e.g., James Schoeberl, Constitutional Law: How Minnesota Unconstitutionally Broadened 
Its Assisted-Suicide Statute—State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 398, 
422 (2015) (“Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute does not define the term ‘assist,’ 
and the plain-meaning interpretation adopted by the court is inappropriate 
because assistance requires some physical action.”); see also Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 885 (1930) (“[I]f [judges] will play fast and 
loose with ‘plain meanings’ . . . they can not hope to convince laymen that they are 
acting rationally or usefully.”).  
Although this author lacked the time and resources to conduct further 
research on this issue, there may be a need for further empirical analysis. Perhaps 
this phenomenon of erroneously finding plain meaning extends beyond Schmitz. It 
would be interesting to see how frequently the court finds plain meaning and to 
consider whether this frequency has changed over time. For further guidance, see 
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Minnesota courts vacillated as to whether or not the civil action 
implicated a civil jury trial.178 Additionally, section 176.82 arises 
under the umbrella of the WCA, which is bereft of jury trials 
altogether.179 In light of these ambiguities, the case was ripe for 
statutory analysis. 
B. Textual Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
1. Noscitur a sociis: “Civil Action” Elsewhere in the WCA and 
Retaliatory Discharge Statutes 
The maxim noscitur a sociis means “a word is known by the 
company it keeps.”180 In statutory interpretation, this means that 
when a word is ambiguous, its meaning can be ascertained by 
reference to its use throughout the statute or act.181 The phrase 
“civil action” is used seven times in the WCA.182 Sometimes the 
language even details “civil actions in district court.”183 This is 
significant because the term should have the same meaning 
throughout the WCA.184 Though “civil action” is never defined,185 
these other seven uses shed light on the fact that the drafters 
understood the distinctiveness of civil actions and workers’ 
 
Driesen, supra note 156, exploring a similar phenomenon in U.S. Supreme Court 
cases and suggesting that the Court increasingly evades statutory interpretation.  
 178.  Compare Karnes, 532 N.W.2d at 563 (describing section 176.82 actions as 
“outside the purview” of the WCA), with Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 
1238, 1246 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[W]here a state legislature enacts a provision within 
its workers’ compensation laws and creates a specific right of action, a civil action 
brought to enforce that right of action is, by definition, a civil action arising under 
the workers’ compensation laws of that state . . . .”). See generally supra notes 113–20 
and accompanying text. 
 179.  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 180.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465 (1991). 
 181.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 
496 (Minn. 2009). 
 182.  MINN. STAT. §§ 176.145, 176.194, subdiv. 1, 176.295, subdiv. 2, 176.351, 
subdiv. 3, 176.411, subdiv. 2, 176.471, subdiv. 9, 176.511, subdiv. 4 (2014). The 
term is surely used numerous times in other Minnesota statutes, but the WCA is 
distinct and is therefore all that is examined. 
 183.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.295, subdiv. 2, 176.351, subdiv. 3, 176.411, subdiv. 
2. 
 184.  Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 
S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 872 (1992) (“To change interpretive horses in midstream 
would defeat the expectations of the legislators who enacted a statute.”). 
 185.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.011. 
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compensation actions.186 By providing for civil actions in district 
courts, the drafters left the door open to jury trials for section 
176.82 claimants. 
It is also useful to look to the language the legislature used in 
other retaliatory discharge acts. In the Whistleblower Act, for 
example, the statute only provides for a “civil action,” failing to 
expressly provide for a jury trial much like in section 176.82.187 In 
the statute prohibiting retribution against pregnant employees, the 
remedies provision specifies the employee “may bring a civil action 
to recover any and all damages recoverable at law.”188 At the bare 
minimum, juxtaposing these various retaliatory discharge statutes 
would have shown that providing for a “civil action,” and no more, 
is not incompatible with courts superimposing the right to a jury 
trial. The court should have engaged in this sort of comparative 
analysis of related statutes to buttress its finding that civil actions 
under section 176.82 are entitled to civil jury trials. 
2. Lex specialis: Specific Terms of Section 176.82 Trump the 
General Provisions of the WCA 
Another helpful Latin maxim of statutory interpretation is lex 
specialis, meaning “the specific trumps the general.”189 In other 
words, a law governing a specific subject matter overrides a law that 
only governs general matters.190 The court could have applied this 
principle in Schmitz to contend that the specific provisions of 
section 176.82, providing plaintiffs with a “civil action,” trump the 
general denial of jury trials in workers’ compensation matters. 
 
 186.  Section 176.145 states, “[N]otice . . . may be served . . . upon any agent of 
the employer upon whom a summons may be served in a civil action.” This 
suggests methods of service in civil actions are separate from, but bear on, service 
in WCA actions. Section 176.194, subdivision 1 similarly provides that “[e]vidence 
of violations under this section shall not be admissible in any civil action,” again 
indicating that typically WCA cases are separate from civil cases. 
 187.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 181.935, with MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1. 
 188.  MINN. STAT. § 181.944 (emphasis added). 
 189.  See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87–89 (1902); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 645.08(3) (“[G]eneral words are construed to be restricted in their 
meaning by preceding particular words.”). 
 190.  Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 522 (1996); Rodgers, 185 U.S. at 89 
(“[T]he special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the 
general act or provision.”); Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 262 Minn. 393, 399, 
115 N.W.2d 22, 26 (1962) (“It is the rule that specific provisions in a statute 
control general provisions.”). 
28
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While this alone would not resolve the case—after all, a civil action 
does not necessarily mean a civil jury trial—it lends support to the 
court’s holding and would have fortified its legal reasoning. 
Analogous to lex specialis is the notion that the new trumps the 
old.191 The WCA was enacted over sixty years before the legislature 
amended it to include section 176.82 claims.192 Although the 
legislature desired to eliminate jury trials in all workers’ 
compensation cases when it was first enacted in 1913, the 
perspective had shifted by 1975 when section 176.82 was added.193 
The newer conception of employee rights envisioned that the 
outcome of employment disputes would be in the jury’s hands.194 
Section 645.08 directs courts that statutory canons of interpretation 
govern, but only to the extent that the interpretation is consistent 
with the intent of the legislature.195 This would suggest that the 
Schmitz court could have devoted more attention to the more 
recent advent of employment laws, and that this legislative intent 
would have trumped the century-old purposes of the WCA as a 
whole. 
C. A Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
Thus far, this case note has only considered textual canons of 
construction, which are far from infallible.196 The court’s arsenal in 
 
 191.  See Fink, 262 Minn. at 399, 115 N.W.2d at 26 (“[I]f there is conflict 
between different statutes as to the same matter, the later statute prevails.”). The 
Latin maxim for this is leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. See Watt v. Alaska, 
451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). However, it is generally used 
when two statutes are in direct conflict, in which case the newer controls. See, e.g., 
Fink, 262 Minn. at 399, 115 N.W.2d at 26. 
 192.  See supra notes 31, 78.  
 193.  Compare supra note 31, and supra note 33, with supra note 78, and supra 
note 87.  
 194.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 195.  MINN. STAT. § 645.08 (2014).  
 196.  See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that “rote repetition” and “wooden reliance 
on those canons” of interpretation can cause unfair results); Thomas A. Bishop, 
The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in Connecticut: A Case Study, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 825, 846 (2009) (“Even though the plain meaning rule, and the canons of 
construction more generally, have a substantial pedigree, their value as useful 
tools of interpretation has received substantial criticism.”); Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 
816 (1983) (“Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the canons do not 
constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the 
29
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statutory interpretation is not limited to analyzing the words 
alone.197 To do so would be to fall into the same trap as the Schmitz 
court when it analyzed case law but neglected the statute.198 
Interpreting the text in isolation is often insufficient to effectively 
elucidate the meaning of a statute.199 One supplemental avenue of 
analysis is the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, which 
relies heavily on the underlying purpose of the legislation in 
construing the statutory language.200 
 
appearance that his decisions are constrained.”); Max Radin, A Short Way with 
Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 423 (1942) (“In all this what room is there for the 
standard ‘canons of interpretations,’ for ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and the 
entire coterie or band of phrases and tags and shibboleths which are so 
wearisomely familiar? I should be tempted to deny that they have ever resolved an 
honest doubt . . . .”).  
 197.  See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 708 (1995) (portraying “text, structure, and legislative history” as a trio of 
interpretive sources). 
 198.  The “trap” in statutory interpretation is when courts rely so heavily on 
textualism at the expense of purposive considerations. Textualism stands in stark 
contrast to purposivism, insisting that “judges should almost never consult, and 
never rely on, the legislative history of a statute.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1998). To analogize 
to contract interpretation, this “four-corners” view is arguably doomed at the 
outset—it “either den[ies] the relevance of the intention of the parties or 
presuppose[s] a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not 
attained.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 
641, 644, 646 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the refusal to consider extrinsic evidence 
to aid in interpreting an indemnity clause constituted reversible error).  
 199.  See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford et al., A Case Study in the Superiority of the 
Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221, 
263 (2012) (“With today’s complex regulatory state, considering statutory text in a 
vacuum will not yield the true meaning of a statute, but considering legislative 
purpose will.”); see also Eskridge, supra note 173, at 990 (advocating “a 
sophisticated methodology that knit[s] together text, context, purpose, and 
democratic and constitutional norms in the service of carrying out the judiciary’s 
constitutional role”).  
 200.  Gifford et al., supra note 199, at 224–25 (“After uncovering the purpose 
of the legislation, Justice Breyer then interprets the statutory language in a manner 
that fulfills these goals.”). In light of this, advocates of the purposive approach 
would likely find the temporal order of this note a bit confusing. They may have 
felt the topic of purposive approach should have preceded the other two canons 
considered here. Nonetheless, this author feels the strength of the purposive 
approach is best used as a supplement when textual considerations alone leave the 
analysis lacking. There seems to be no reason that the court could not turn to the 
purposive approach subsequently to supplement other canons and interpretive 
tools.  
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Notably, this purposive approach is largely objective,201 looking 
broadly at the legislative context, as opposed to the subjective 
intents of particular drafters.202 In a way, it personifies the statute, 
trying to look into the mind of the statute as opposed to the brains 
of the legislators.203 At the same time, the purposive approach 
acknowledges the legislative body behind the statute; this aligns 
with the notion of judicial deference and the judicial branch 
serving as a “subordinate ‘honest agent’ of the legislative body.”204 
Although Justice Breyer is often credited with the purposive 
approach,205 he is simply an advocate of what section 645.16 already 
enables the courts to consider.206 
 
 201.  This author notes the possibility that despite its objective intentions, the 
purposive approach could fall victim to the same subjectivity and judicial 
discretion as with the textual canons of interpretation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice 
Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1741 (2006) (mentioning “the 
difficulty of characterizing purposes . . . without an evaluative judgment of the 
interpreter’s own [purpose]”).  
 202.  See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A 
Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 730 (2009) (“A purposive 
approach, on the other hand, seeks to attribute a purpose to the law in question 
by looking at objective elements, such as the language of the statute and certain 
types of legislative history, to determine what the statute seeks to achieve. The 
question is not what particular drafters sought to achieve, but what the statutory 
language and legislative history show the statute seeks to achieve.”). Contra Posner, 
supra note 196, at 817 (“The judge should try to think his way as best he can into 
the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the 
statute applied to the case at bar.”).  
 203.  See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 52 (N.Y. 1989) (suggesting 
that a statute is a creature in and of itself, and that “a court’s role is not to delve 
into the minds of legislators, but rather to effectuate the statute by carrying out 
the purpose of the statute as it is embodied in the words chosen by the 
Legislature.”). But see Sunstein, supra note 201, at 1739 (suggesting that legislative 
purpose cannot be found, and is instead always attributed to the legislature).  
 204.  Carlos E. Gonzalez, The 2006 David J. Stouffer Lecture: Statutory 
Interpretation: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 703, 710 (2006) 
(“[W]hen interpreting statutes, agent courts should act on behalf of the legislative 
principal, rather than on their own behalf.”).  
 205.  See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243–44 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he textual question considered alone is a close one. . . . I 
would look to other sources, including legislative history, statutory purpose, and 
the views of the federal administrative agency. . . .”). 
 206.  Although this note does not aim to provide a comprehensive history of 
statutory interpretation, it is interesting to have some historical perspective on the 
matter. “Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Court subscribed to the 
traditional purposivist framework,” as exemplified by the 1892 case Holy Trinity 
31
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Section 645.16 is, in many ways, a codification of this purposive 
approach.207 It provides that “the object of all interpretation and 
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of 
the legislature.”208 When a statute’s language is not entirely clear, 
courts can determine the statute’s meaning by considering various 
factors, such as (1) “the occasion and necessity for the law,” (2) 
“the circumstances under which it was enacted,” and (3) “the 
contemporaneous legislative history.”209 This note will now examine 
these three sources in interpreting the statute at issue in Schmitz. 
1. The Occasion and Necessity for the Law 
First, the occasion and necessity for the law prohibiting 
retaliatory discharge was protecting workers and safeguarding their 
statutory right to workers’ compensation. Section 176.82 sought to 
protect workers from being fired for exercising their statutory right 
 
Church v. United States. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 
113, 113 (2011); see also Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 
(1892) (referencing the “spirit” and “intention” of the lawmakers). It was not until 
the final decade of the twentieth century that “statutory interpretation wars” began 
and the purposive model was challenged. Manning, supra note 206, at 113; Abbe 
R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus 
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1843–44 (2010).  
 207.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2014). Although statutory interpretation occurs 
at the state supreme courts and the Supreme Court alike, much of the scholarly 
debate on statutory interpretation comes from federal law “where . . . no agreed 
methodological rules exist.” Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 
96 MINN. L. REV. 520, 583 n.83 (2011). As a result, state courts can create and 
employ their own rules. Id. At one point, Connecticut had adopted the purposive 
approach in all matters of statutory interpretation, even when the language was 
unambiguous. See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 578 (Conn. 2003) (“[W]e 
ordinarily will consider all of those sources beyond the language itself, without first 
having to cross any threshold of ambiguity of the language.”). However, within a 
matter of months this was superseded by statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1–2z 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“If . . . the meaning of [statutory] text is 
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, 
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”); see 
also Paul Dinto Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 835 A.2d 33, 39 n.10 
(Conn. 2003) (acknowledging that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s purposive 
approach had been legislatively overruled). As Courchesne demonstrates, while state 
courts are free to innovate in methods of statutory interpretation, they ultimately 
must answer to the state legislatures. 
 208.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16. 
 209.  Id. 
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to workers’ compensation.210 The right to compensation under the 
WCA would be meaningless if an employee could be fired for 
utilizing his or her benefits.211 As part of the compensation bargain, 
employees gave up the right to traditional negligence actions, but 
they did not agree to suffer reprisal for exercising their legal right 
to compensation. 
The legislature clearly viewed the threat of retaliatory 
discharge as a serious matter, so much so that the statute provides 
for punitive damages.212 The threat of treble damages serves as a 
deterrent to employers, endeavoring to shield employees from 
retaliatory discharge.213 The Minnesota Supreme Court has even 
commented on this connection between protecting employees and 
punishing employers in several prior section 176.82 cases.214 
Looking at the necessity for the law would have helped the 
Schmitz court reinforce its holding that the exclusivity of the WCA 
did not govern and the salient consideration was instead workers’ 
rights. To protect employees receiving benefits under the WCA, it 
makes sense to have a provision that provides for the oversight of 
the civil court system215—and the oversight of a jury, as well. 
 
 210.  Id. § 176.82. 
 211.  See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Fired Employees and/or Frozen-Out 
Shareholders (an Essay), 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1444 (1996) (“The premise 
of these statutes [prohibiting retaliatory discharge] is that rights guaranteed 
employees would be hollow if employers could terminate employees who assert 
statutory rights.”). 
 212.  MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (“[P]unitive damages not to exceed three times the 
amount of any compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled”). The 
statute even provides for costs and reasonable attorney fees, which is further 
indicative of a worker-friendly purpose. See id. It also indicates that the damages 
awarded are not to be offset by workers’ compensation benefits received. Id.  
 213.  See Steefel, supra note 92, at 470 (“[T]he possibility of punitive damages 
being awarded will deter employers from discharging at-will employees who refuse 
to violate a statutory or constitutional provision.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 549.20 
(“Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for 
the rights or safety of others.”); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 
1978).  
 214.  See, e.g., Bergeson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 414 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 
1987) (discussing treble punitive damages as “a kind of damages reserved 
traditionally for conduct which is outrageous”); Wojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310 
N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (viewing punitive damages as reflective of a dual 
“concern for employees’ welfare” and “a desire to punish employers and deter 
them from the forbidden conduct.”).  
 215.  See Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1984) 
33
Odom: Civil Procedure: Statutory Interpretation: Compensating for Ambig
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
13 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:59 PM 
2016] SCHMITZ V. U.S. STEEL CORP. 479 
2. The Circumstances Under Which the Law Was Enacted 
Second, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of 
section 176.82 reflect a broader commitment to prohibitions on 
retaliatory discharge. The statute was enacted during an era in 
which the legislature sought to protect workers’ rights generally.216 
This emphasis on protecting individuals in the course of their 
employment, whether for whistleblowing or workers’ 
compensation, was seen as an exception to the common-law rule of 
at-will employment. In the years leading up to and following the 
passage of section 176.82, the courts were increasingly willing to 
carve out exceptions to the doctrine.217 Perhaps this can be 
extrapolated to support the proposition that the legislature was also 
willing to carve out an exception to the exclusivity principle of the 
WCA. The environment surrounding the enactment demonstrates 
that retaliatory discharge was an increasingly respected cause of 
action that merited protections, both from the legislature by way of 
statutes and from the judicial branch by way of case law. 
3. The Contemporaneous Legislative History 
Finally, the contemporaneous legislative history can provide 
valuable insight into the intent of the legislature.218 Unlike analysis 
of legislative intent, which focuses solely on the purposes of the 
 
(“The only effective way to prevent an employer from interfering with his 
employees’ rights to seek compensation is to recognize that [the employee] has a 
cause of action for retaliatory discharge when the discharge is motivated by the 
desire to punish the employee for seeking the benefits to which he is entitled by 
law.”); Ann-Marie Ahern, Fight Back Against Retaliation, TRIAL, June 2002, at 45 
(“[W]orkers should not have to choose between their livelihoods and their health. 
If an employer can intimidate employees or punish them for seeking redress, then 
the employer could render workers’ protection under those statutes null.”).  
 216.  See supra Part II.C.1–.2. 
 217.  See, e.g., supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
 218.  See, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087, 1091–93, 1095 (Or. 
1978) (engaging in analysis of legislative history of statutes relating to unlawful 
employment practices before holding plaintiff was entitled to file common-law 
action for wrongful discharge). But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the 
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1833, 1884 (1998) (“In other respects, however, consulting legislative history 
for evidence of general purpose may aggravate, rather than alleviate, the problem 
of judicial competence. . . . [E]vidence of general purpose in the legislative history 
often involves political, social, or economic problems that are nonlegal and highly 
controversial . . . .”). 
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legislators that took part in the drafting efforts, analysis of 
legislative history reveals broader purposes and intentions.219 With 
regards to section 176.82, the legislative history is rather 
uncomplicated. Less than four months elapsed between its first 
reading and its passage,220 and only two committees considered the 
legislation.221 There is no record of contentious debate or any 
revisions during this time.222 But this absence of history, in and of 
itself, may be indicative of the legislative support behind this 
newfound action for retaliatory discharge in the workers’ 
compensation context. The lack of debate on the “civil action” 
versus “civil jury trial” matter may also suggest that the legislature 
simply assumed they could provide for a “civil action” and that the 
courts would automatically imbue this language with the right to 
civil jury trial, as jury trials were traditionally associated with other 
retaliatory discharge actions.223 While the legislative history of 
section 176.82 may not be rich with information, the lack thereof 
speaks for itself.224 
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Courts have little to lose by engaging in statutory 
interpretation, particularly when the effort is concurrent with a 
careful consideration of case law. The legislature specifically 
 
 219.  See generally Vermeule, supra note 218, at 1883–85 (discussing two 
varieties of legislative intent—specific intent versus general legislative purpose); 
Radin, supra note 177, at 872 (criticizing legislative intent as “undiscoverable in 
fact, irrelevant if it were discovered . . . [and] a queerly amorphous piece of 
slag.”).  
 220.  This author went to the Minnesota Historical Society Library in Saint 
Paul, Minnesota, to research the statute’s legislative history. The archival legislative 
records revealed that the bill was first read on February 20, 1975, and ultimately 
passed on June 5, 1975.  
 221.  Section 176.82 was referred to the Committee on Governmental 
Operations on February 20, 1975, after its first reading. A Conference Committee 
on the matter was appointed on May 13, 1975.  
 222.  Neither the House nor Senate Journals included any supplemental 
transcripts, audio taped discussions, committee minutes, or notes regarding 
debate within the committees or on the floor of the House or Senate. 
 223.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
 224.  But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 530 n.13 (1985) 
(“[C]ongressional silence, no matter how ‘clanging,’ cannot override the words of 
the statute.”); Ill., Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 
1983) (“Not every silence is pregnant . . . .”). 
35
Odom: Civil Procedure: Statutory Interpretation: Compensating for Ambig
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
13 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:59 PM 
2016] SCHMITZ V. U.S. STEEL CORP. 481 
empowered the courts through section 645.16 to look at factors 
such as the necessity for the law, the circumstances of its 
enactment, and the related legislative history.225 And as the 
Minnesota Supreme Court intelligently observed in Karst v. F.C. 
Hayer Co., “If we have incorrectly defined the legislative intent, the 
legislature may quickly correct us.”226 
Though section 176.82 carved out a civil action for plaintiffs in 
1975, it was not until 2014 that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
confirmed that this civil action for retaliatory discharge under the 
WCA indeed includes the civil right to a jury trial, as well.227 
What matters is not so much the jury trial itself—after all, very 
few cases actually get to trial228—but the image of getting to the 
jury. If a WCA retaliation case were to go to trial, the jury would 
likely be sympathetic to the plaintiff.229 Retaliatory discharge adds 
insult to literal injury: first the plaintiff is hurt at work, and then he 
gets fired because of it. This would likely increase the settlement 
values of section 176.82 claims as the potential for a million dollar 
jury verdict230 would presumably encourage employers to settle. 
The flip side of this risk of high jury verdicts is that it may scare 
employers, who could be more apt to foreclose the possibility of 
section 176.82 retaliation claims when an employee settles his 
 
 225.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 226.  447 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Minn. 1989).  
 227.  Law of June 4, 1975, ch. 359, §§ 21, 23, 1975 Minn. Laws 1188 (codified 
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subdiv. 1 (2014)); Schmitz III, 852 N.W.2d 669, 
677 (Minn. 2014).  
 228.  Marshall H. Tanick, Trial by Jury Arduous Attempts to Appropriate and Avert, 
BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2012, at 25 (noting that “no more than 5 percent of all 
civil cases ever reach juries” and attributing this to the growing emphasis on 
alternative dispute resolution).  
 229.  See Ahern, supra note 215, at 45 (“Unlike employment discrimination 
cases, retaliation cases involve motives that juries readily understand: The idea that 
an employer may want to rid its workforce of employees who file costly 
compensation claims is plausible to jurors who may see corporate America as 
greedy. Jurors are also quick to understand the highly offensive nature of 
retaliation. The idea that an employer could terminate an employee simply 
because he or she sought redress for a work-related injury offends fundamental 
notions of fairness.”).  
 230.  Robin Potter, Collateral Tort Claims in Employment Law—The Tort of 
Retaliatory Discharge, in 1 ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA CLE 363 
(2000), 2000 WL 1120401 (“[T]he tort of retaliatory discharge[] has resulted in 
high verdicts and hotly litigated cases.”). 
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workers’ compensation case.231 In other words, settlement 
agreements within the administrative system may increasingly 
include provisions that the employee fully releases all future civil 
actions under section 176.82. This occasionally happened prior to 
Schmitz,232 but employers may be inclined to do so more frequently 
due to the looming threat of large jury awards. 
The impact of Schmitz should not be exaggerated, however. In 
the year since it was decided, it has only been cited by one 
Minnesota court in an unpublished opinion.233 The Schmitz holding 
does not open the floodgates to an onslaught of retaliatory 
discharge claims, as plaintiffs still must prove not only wrongful 
termination, but the causal nexus to the exercise of workers’ 
compensation rights.234 Nonetheless, if a plaintiff can jump through 
these hoops, he has the potential to see a substantial jury verdict.235 
 
 231.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.521 (“The commissioner, a compensation judge, 
and the district court shall exercise discretion in approving or disapproving a 
proposed settlement.”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., supra note 61 
(discussing compromise and release agreements, also known as “stipulations for 
settlement”).  
 232.  See, e.g., Weilder v. Johanning Trans-Fare, Inc., No. WC05-147, 2005 WL 
1901570, at *2 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. June 30, 2005) (reviewing 
employee’s petition to vacate a stipulation for settlement that was executed solely 
to eliminate a close out of section 176.82 claims).  
 233.  McDonal v. SuperValu, Inc., No. A14-1228, 2015 WL 1401636, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015). Schmitz has technically been cited in two cases, but 
in one instance it was for an issue unrelated to the retaliatory discharge claims. See 
Kaufenberg v. Winkley Co., No. A14-1514, 2015 WL 3539744, at *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 8, 2015) (citing Schmitz only for the Faragher/Ellerth issue). 
 234.  See Gary & Tanick, supra note 109, at n.14 (discussing the floodgates 
concern after Abraham, which permitted jury trials for retaliatory discharge actions 
under the Whistleblower Act); James T. Mellon, Michigan Worker’s Compensation 
Retaliation Tort: Its Origin and Development, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 61, 88–89 
(2002) (“The cause of action is difficult for a plaintiff to prove because an 
employer rarely announces that the reason for the discriminatory conduct is in 
retaliation for the employee’s asserting a right under the Michigan Worker's 
Disability Compensation Act.”).  
 235.  For example, one (admittedly outdated) survey showed that plaintiffs in 
wrongful termination suits in California received punitive damages averaging 
$494,000. William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for 
Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404, 406 (1987). However, the countervailing factor is 
that Minnesota’s statute limits punitive damages to “three times the amount of any 
[workers’] compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled.” MINN. STAT.  
§ 176.82. Further diminishing this risk is the cost of litigation generally. See 
Yonover, supra note 90, at 93 (“It could cost an employee over $10,000 just to get 
to trial; the judicial process is both expensive and lengthy.”).  
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On a larger scale, the Schmitz decision is yet another case in the 
line of retaliatory discharge cases. It further entrenches employee 
rights by giving teeth to the statutory promise of a civil action. 
Although Minnesota does not have a general public policy 
prohibition on retaliatory discharge, cases like Schmitz contribute to 
an across-the-board expansion of wrongful discharge law in 
Minnesota. Hopefully Schmitz will signal to legislators how future 
statutes should be drafted to provide for civil jury trials in other 
retaliatory discharge statutes or other WCA causes of action.236 
Though the court’s conclusion is sound, its rationale is 
lacking. The Minnesota Supreme Court could have strengthened 
its analysis by not only reconciling the conflicting case law but also 
reconciling statutory ambiguities. Had the court bolstered its 
reasoning with the principles of statutory interpretation, it would 
have diminished the likelihood of further challenges to the 
meaning of section 176.82. 
 
 236.  See Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 74, 93 N.W.2d 690, 
698 (1958) (“[T]he legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of 
its words . . . .”). Whether or not Schmitz will prove instructive and affect the 
legislature’s drafting of future statutes remains to be seen, but without my rose-
colored glasses on, I am less than optimistic about the prospect.  
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